La cultura del agua debe ser vinculada de forma especial a las manifestaciones del patrimonio cultural intangible de los pueblos, como las tradiciones orales o escritas, la simbología o los rituales, que conforman lo que llamamos los Imaginarios del Agua. Estos deben ser analizados y deconstruidos a la luz de los nuevos paradigmas, como la hermenéutica y la ecocrítica. De este modo, la mitografía ayuda a perfilar el significado profundo de la cultura del agua ante las nuevas demandas medioambientales, educativas (...) y culturales del siglo XXI, en un contexto donde el agua ya no es solo un recurso estratégico, sino un bien cultural ligado al desarrollo local y a las políticas de sostenibilidad. Por ello, al conocer las tradiciones ancestrales y los imaginarios en torno al agua, y al sensibilizar a los alumnos con los valores plurales de estas manifestaciones culturales --que siempre van encaminados al respeto y al conocimiento del patrimonio natural y cultural--, contribuimos de forma decisiva a la gobernanza del agua y a la gestión sostenible y responsable de los recursos hídricos, pues sin duda el principal problema de la sostenibilidad será la educación de los ciudadanos. Water culture must be linked in a special way to expressions of intangible cultural heritage of peoples, such as oral or written traditions, symbols or rituals that make up what we call the imaginary water. They must be analyzed and deconstructed in the light of the new paradigms, such as hermeneutics and the ecocriticism. Thus, mythography helps shape the profound meaning of the culture of the water at the new environmental, educational and cultural demands of the 21st century, in a context where the water is not only a strategic resource but a cultural property linked to local development and sustainability policies. Therefore, to know the ancestral traditions and imaginaries in connection to water, and to educate students with the plural values of these cultural manifestations, --which always aimed to respect and knowledge of the natural and cultural heritage-- we contribute decisively to the governance of the water and the sustainable and responsible management of water resources then no doubt the main problem of sustainability will be the education of citizens. (shrink)

A recent issue of Topics in Cognitive Science featured 11 thoughtful commentaries responding to our article “What happened to cognitive science?” (Núñez et al., 2019). Here, we identify several themes that arose in those commentaries and respond to each. Crucial to understanding our original article is the fundamental distinction between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary endeavors: Cognitive science began (and has stayed) as multidisciplinary but has failed to move on to form a cohesive interdisciplinary field. We clarify and elaborate our original argument (...) and reiterate the importance of a data‐driven evaluation of the current status of the field, which exhibits a marked disciplinary imbalance, a lack of a coherent conceptual core, and a striking absence of a consistent curriculum in the institutions that grant degrees in this domain. Half a century after the creation of cognitive science, it may now be a good time to revisit goals and visions for how to best approach the ever‐fascinating scientific study of the mind(s). (shrink)

We begin by introducing our readers to the Extended Mind Thesis and briefly discuss a series of arguments in its favour. We continue by showing of such a theory can be resisted and go on to demonstrate that a more conservative account of cognition can be developed. We acknowledge a stalemate between these two different accounts of cognition and notice a couple of issues that we argue have prevented further progress in the field. To overcome the stalemate, we propose to (...) focus on the ethical implications of these theories. We link work conducted on the Extended Mind Thesis with contemporary transhumanist research and claim that extended may be ethically preferred over embedded because it is a more progressive and inclusive theory. (shrink)

Many governments have seen digital health technologies as promising tools to tackle the current COVID-19 pandemic. A much-talked example in this context involves the recent deluge of digital contact tracing apps aimed at detecting Covid-19 exposure. In this short contribution we look at the bio-political justification of this phenomenon and reflect on whether DCT apps constitute, as it is often argued, a serious potential breach of our right to privacy. Despite praising efforts attempting to develop legal and ethical frameworks for (...) DCT apps’ usage; we argue that such endeavours are not sufficient to tackle the more fundamental problem of mass surveillance, which will remain largely unaddressed unless we deal with the biopolitical arguments presented and resort to a technical and structural defence. (shrink)

Advances in artificial intelligence and robotics stand to change many aspects of our lives, including our values. If trends continue as expected, many industries will undergo automation in the near future, calling into question whether we can still value the sense of identity and security our occupations once provided us with. Likewise, the advent of social robots driven by AI, appears to be shifting the meaning of numerous, long-standing values associated with interpersonal relationships, like friendship. Furthermore, powerful actors’ and institutions’ (...) increasing reliance on AI to make decisions that may affect how people live their lives may have a significant impact on privacy while also raising issues about algorithmic transparency and human control. In this paper, building and expanding on previous works, we will look at how the deployment of Artificial Intelligence technology may lead to changes in identity, security, and other crucial values. We will discuss what challenges we may face in the process, while critically reflecting on whether such changes may be desirable. Finally, drawing on a series of considerations underlying virtue ethics, we will formulate a set of preliminary suggestions, which—we hope—can be used to more carefully guide the future roll out of AI technologies for human flourishing; that is, for social and moral good. (shrink)

La muerte resulta problemática para la contemporaneidad. El existencialismo es una corriente filosófica que presenta la facticidad de la mortalidad como propia de la vida. El pensador Albert Camus articula los pilares fundamentales de su filosofía en torno a la experiencia de la muerte, que lleva al absurdo, del que debe partir la acción rebelde. En esta investigación se analizan algunas dinámicas que, pretendiendo huir de la muerte, solo han conseguido hacernos débiles frente a ella. Presentaremos a Sísifo y Rieux, (...) dos de los personajes de sus escritos, como aquellos paradigmas de conducta que pueden contribuir a hacernos más conscientes del absurdo y poder, de este modo, vivir, amar y luchar. (shrink)

How should human beings and robots interact with one another? Nyholm’s answer to this question is given below in the form of a conditional: If a robot looks or behaves like an animal or a human being then we should treat them with a degree of moral consideration (p. 201). Although this is not a novel claim in the literature on ai ethics, what is new is the reason Nyholm gives to support this claim; we should treat robots that look (...) like human or non-human animals with a certain degree of moral restraint out of respect for human beings or other beings with moral status. Although Danaher or Coeckelbergh also claim that we should treat robots with a degree of moral consideration, the reasons they give for making this claim focus on duties or rights attaching to the robot themselves (see J. Danaher, “Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism,” Science and Engineering Ethics, (2019): 1–27 or M. Coeckelbergh, “Moral Appearances: Emotions, Robots and Human Morality,” Ethics and Information Technology, 12(3) (2010): 235–241.). Nyholm disagrees with this type of reasoning and claims that until robots develop a human or animal like inner life, we have no direct duties to the robots themselves. Rather, it is out of respect for human beings or other beings with moral status that we should treat some robots with moral restraint. Gerdes, similarly inspired by Kant, focuses on the human agent to argue that we should avoid treating robots in cruel ways because this may corrupt the human agent’s character (see A. Gerdes, “The Issue of Moral Consideration in Robot Ethics,” siggas Computers and Society, 45(3) (2015): 274–279.). Nyholm’s contribution here is to extend this view such that the corruption or harm being done is against the humanity in all of us. (shrink)

Block (Trends Cogn Sci 7:285–286, 2003) and Prinz (PSYCHE 12:1–19, 2006) have defended the idea that SSD perception remains in the substituting modality (auditory or tactile). Hurley and Noë (Biol Philos 18:131–168, 2003) instead argued that after substantial training with the device, the perceptual experience that the SSD user enjoys undergoes a change, switching from tactile/auditory to visual. This debate has unfolded in something like a stalemate where, I will argue, it has become difficult to determine whether the perception acquired (...) through the coupling with an SSD remains in the substituting or the substituted modality. Within this puzzling deadlock two new approaches have been recently suggested. Ward and Meijer (Conscious Cogn 19:492–500, 2010) describe SSD perception as visual-like but characterize it as a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia. Auvray et al. (Perception 36:416–430, 2007) and Auvray and Myin (Cogn Sci 33:1036–1058, 2009) suggest that SSDs let their users experience a new kind of perception. Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) refine this position, and argue that this new kind of perception depends on pre-existing senses without entirely aligning with any of them. So, they have talked about perceptual experience in SSDs as going "beyond vision". In a similar vein, MacPherson (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011a) claims that “if the subjects (SSD users) have experiences with both vision-like and touch-like representational characteristics then perhaps they have a sense that ordinary humans do not” (MacPherson in Oxford University Press, New York, 2011a, p. 139). (shrink)

L’autore si propone di investigare i rapporti tra retorica e tempo nel “Dialogo sui due massimi sistemi del mondo” di Galileo Galilei, giustificando l’analisi retorico-stilistica della prosa scientifica sintesi di ragione e immaginazione, stabilendo un parallelo tra l’abbattimento della discontinuità tra Cielo e Terra e alcune innovazioni retoriche della prosa galileiana che precede il Dialogo e prendendo in considerazione passi del “Dialogo” in cui Galileo manipola i concetti di ‘tempus’ e ‘aeternitas’ tramite metafore, similitudini e altre figure, che sono strumento (...) essenziale alla dimostrazione della tesi che interessa, cioè quella della fondamentale identità tra cielo e terra, dell’unità del tempo cosmico. (shrink)

There are two ways interpreters have tended to understand the nature of the laws of Kant’s pure general logic. On the first, these laws are unconditional norms for how we ought to think, and will govern anything that counts as thinking. On the second, these laws are formal criteria for being a thought, and violating them makes a putative thought not a thought. These traditions are in tension, in so far as the first depends on the possibility of thoughts that (...) violate these laws, and the second makes violation impossible. In this essay I develop an interpretation of Kant’s pure general logic that overcomes this tension. It accounts for the possibility of logical mistakes, as the first tradition does, while still establishing the absolute impossibility of logical aliens, as the second tradition does. I then argue that the formalist insight that illogical exercises of the understanding are not alternative ways coherent thoughts could have been, but are mere confusions, is fundamental for achieving a proper understanding of the absolute normativity of the laws of pure general logic. (shrink)

Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to (...) do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe. When such agents do not form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe, they need not be irrational if they do not conform to these requirements. (shrink)

Alexithymic traits, which entail finding it difficult to recognize and describe one’s own emotions, are linked with poor trait emotional intelligence and difficulties in identifying and managing stressors. There is evidence that alexithymia may have detrimental consequences for wellbeing and health, beginning in adolescence. In this cross-sectional study, we investigated the prevalence and incidence of alexithymia in teenage girls, testing the statistical power of TEI and student burnout to discriminate between high- and low-alexithymic subjects. A sample of 884 female high (...) school students attending three Italian academic-track high schools completed self-report measures of alexithymia, school burnout, and TEI. Main descriptive statistics and correlational analysis preceded the discriminant analysis. The mean alexithymia scores suggest a high prevalence of alexithymia in female adolescents; as expected, this trait was negatively correlated with TEI and positively associated with school burnout. Participants with high vs. low alexithymia profiles were discriminated by a combination of TEI and burnout scores. High scores for the emotionality and self-control dimensions of TEI were strongly associated with membership of the low alexithymia group; high scores for the emotional exhaustion dimension of school burnout were indicative of membership of the high alexithymia group. These findings suggest crucial focuses for educational intervention: efforts to reduce the risk of emotional exhaustion and school burnout should especially concentrate on enhancing emotional awareness and self-control skills, both strongly associated with low levels of alexithymia. (shrink)

Traditional cognitive science is Cartesian in the sense that it takes as fundamental the distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world. This leads to the claim that cognition is representational and best explained using models derived from AI and computational theory. The authors depart radically from this model.

In Section 1, I introduce three views that explain human cognitive development from different standpoints: Marcus’s neo-nativism, standard neuroconstructivism, and neo-neuroconstructivism. In Section 2, I assess Marcus’s attempt to reconcile nativism with developmental flexibility. In Section 3, I argue that in structurally reconfiguring nativism, Marcus ends up transforming it into an unrecognizable form, and I claim that his view could be accommodated within the more general framework provided by standard neuroconstructivism. In Section 4, I focus on recent empirical findings in (...) neuropsychology and cultural/social neuroscience, and propose a friendly revision to standard neuroconstructivism, thus developing the neo-neuroconstructivist view. I conclude the article in Section 5 by analysing the implications of the results discussed in Section 4 for both neo-nativism and standard neuroconstructivism. 1 Introduction2 Marcus’s Neo-nativism3 Is Marcus’s Neo-nativism Really a Form of Nativism?4 Neo-neuroconstructivism and Dynamic Enskillment5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Este artículo expone algunas actualizaciones del cronotopo bajtiniano del camino en tres filmes del “novísimo cine chileno”. En primer lugar, se estudiarán las modalidades viajeras que las tres obras proponen, gracias a nociones de la filosofía y la teoría del turismo.2 Se identificará, luego, una serie de submotivos cronotópicos, verdaderos momentos afectivos, que desembocarán en nuestra hipótesis de trabajo; a saber, que las protagonistas de cada filme recorren un “espacio liso”, genérico, hecho de intensidades, un “medio” donde lo que prima (...) es la “experiencia”, el aprendizaje y el encuentro con sí mismas. (shrink)

Despite recent research showing that children rapidly interpret human action in terms of intention, a long tradition of empirical research on moral development and recent conceptual analyses of the deontic domain suggest that children do not apply their understanding of intention to the deontic domain. However, two experiments are described showing that children do make that connection. Preschool children heard stories in which a protagonist was obliged to meet a particular condition if an action was to be taken (e.g. obliged (...) to wear a coat if playing outside). When shown four pictures depicting each possible combination of: (1) the protagonist either performing the action or not, and (2) deliberately or accidentally failing to meet the obligation, children appropriately identified the protagonist as naughty when he or she was depicted as deliberately not meeting the obligation while performing the action. The findings proved to be robust across two different cultural settings. Implications for research on children’s developing theory of mind and their understanding of deontic concepts are discussed. (shrink)

This paper investigates the claim that artificial Intelligence Systems cannot be held morally responsible because they do not have an ability for agential self-awareness e.g. they cannot be aware that they are the agents of an action. The main suggestion is that if agential self-awareness and related first person representations presuppose an awareness of a self, the possibility of responsible artificial intelligence systems cannot be evaluated independently of research conducted on the nature of the self. Focusing on a specific account (...) of the self from the phenomenological tradition, this paper suggests that a minimal necessary condition that artificial intelligence systems must satisfy so that they have a capability for self-awareness, is having a minimal self defined as ‘a sense of ownership’. As this sense of ownership is usually associated with having a living body, one suggestion is that artificial intelligence systems must have similar living bodies so they can have a sense of self. Discussing cases of robotic animals as examples of the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a sense of self, the paper concludes that the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a ‘sense of ownership’ or a sense of self may be a necessary condition for having responsibility. (shrink)

La dimensión ética respecto al uso de la inteligencia artificial es hoy un debate obligado en diversas áreas del conocimiento. Los beneficios de la IA en la educación son innegables, sin embargo, invitan a los educadores a una reflexión profunda respecto a los objetivos que se espera alcanzar en los aprendizajes, así como a los riesgos que este tipo de tecnología presenta. A través de una revisión bibliográfica sobre los alcances éticos en educación, se constata la existencia de diversas regulaciones (...) que, desde la perspectiva humanista, apuntan a un uso responsable, sin perder de vista que el fin último es la persona y su dignidad. La ética corre tras los avances tecnológicos, pues la reflexión sobre el uso adecuado de ellas no logra anticiparse a su rápida implementación. Unesco y el Consenso de Beijing señalan que la IA debe estar al servicio de la educación y que es crucial promover una utilización equitativa e inclusiva, transparente y responsable. Generar confianza debe ser el pilar fundamental de esta construcción ética, por ello exige que los líderes escolares y los docentes reflexionen la finalidad del uso; se promueva una adecuada capacitación; se identifiquen beneficios y riesgos y se incorpore a toda la comunidad educativa. (shrink)

Many faces of consciousness -- Ethics, religion, and the identity of self -- States of mind -- Why hearts don't love and brains don't pump -- EEG : a window on the mind -- Dynamic patterns as shadows of thought -- Networks, waves, and resonant binding -- The limits of science : What do we really know? -- Modern physics, cosmology, and consciousness -- The weird behavior of quantum systems -- Ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics -- Does the brain create (...) the mind? (shrink)

In hybrid nature that results from a random mix of technological infrastructures and natural ecosystems, environmental fundamentals are modified producing dramatic effects on the semiosis of several species. Human intrusion in ecosystems creates new spatial configurations that have a reduced ecological complexity when compared with systems less affected by human manipulation. This causes cascading effects on other environmental fundamentals. F.i., systems that face a low complexity, are more exposed to changes that in turn can reduce the performances of individual species (...) due to a higher level of uncertainty. The flux of information could be apparently maintained in hybrid nature when some natural patterns and processes are replaced by human artifacts and associated dynamics, but the process of signification could be strongly modified. The strict contact between people and wild organisms in hybrid nature requires new types of strategies to guarantee the continuation of the natural dynamic of populations and communities. Rural sanctuaries are proposed as one of the possible models on which to invest in order to harmonize the technological and natural processes with the goal to assure a multiscale sustainability. (shrink)

The quarantine model, recently proposed by Pereboom and Caruso, is one of the most influential models developed to date in the context of criminal justice. The quarantine model challenges the very idea of criminal punishment and asserts that nobody deserves punishment on a fundamental level. Instead, in order to deal with offenders, it proposes a series of incapacitation measures based on public safety concerns. In this article, we examine several objections to the quarantine model that demonstrate how, in our view, (...) it can be improved. These mainly pertain to (2.1) the difficulty of reliably identifying dangerous individuals and consequently the need to base confinement decisions on probability, and (2.2) the potential for the quarantine model not to properly deter certain crimes. Three additional objections are raised with respect to (3.1) the rights that are potentially suppressed in the quarantine model; (3.2) the role of “genetic justice”; and (3.3) the difficulty it faces accommodating reasons-responsiveness. Whereas these objections do not constitute knock-down arguments against the quarantine model, they highlight issues that invite closer scrutiny, at least if it is to be considered as a credible framework for the development of viable policies in criminal justice. (shrink)

In programs of acoustic survey, the amount of data collected and the lack of automatic routines for their classification and interpretation can represent a serious obstacle to achieving quick results. To overcome these obstacles, we are proposing an ecosemiotic model of data mining, ecoacoustic event detection and identification, that uses a combination of the acoustic complexity indices and automatically extracts the ecoacoustic events of interest from the sound files. These events may be indicators of environmental functioning at the scale of (...) individual vocal species, the acoustic community, the sound marks, or the soundscape. The EEDI model is represented by three procedural steps: 1) selecting acoustic data according to environmental variables, 2) detecting the events by creating an ecoacoustic event space produced by plotting ACIft and its evenness, 3) identifying events according to the level of correlation between the acoustic signature of the detected events and an ad hoc library of previously identified events. The EEDI procedure can be extensively used in basic and applied research. In particular, EEDI may be used in long-term monitoring programs to assess the effect of climate change on individual vocal species behavior, population, and acoustic community dynamics. The EEDI model can be also used to investigate acoustic human intrusion in natural systems and the effect in urban areas. (shrink)

One can intend the actions of others, even when one believes such actions are not under one’s control. Call the objects of intentions “ends”; the ends that consist (partly or wholly) of other people’s actions “social”; and the ends that consist of things one believes one cannot control “recalcitrant”. The thesis, then, is that one can intend recalcitrant social ends. I present a positive argument in favor of this idea, and then argue against some purported conditions on the possible content (...) of intentions that would rule out the possibility of intending such ends. The positive argument is the following: intentions are realized by a certain cluster of dispositions. One can come to be so disposed towards recalcitrant social ends. So one can come to be disposed toward such ends in the manner that realizes an intention. So one can intend recalcitrant social ends. The conditions against which I argue are known in the literature as the Own Action Condition, the Control Condition, and the Settle Condition. I present cases where, intuitively, agents genuinely intend ends that would be ruled out by these conditions. (shrink)

One can intend the actions of others, even when one believes such actions are not under one’s control. Call the objects of intentions “ends”; the ends that consist of other people’s actions “social”; and the ends that consist of things one believes one cannot control “recalcitrant”. The thesis, then, is that one can intend recalcitrant social ends. I present a positive argument in favor of this idea, and then argue against some purported conditions on the possible content of intentions that (...) would rule out the possibility of intending such ends. The positive argument is the following: intentions are realized by a certain cluster of dispositions. One can come to be so disposed towards recalcitrant social ends. So one can come to be disposed toward such ends in the manner that realizes an intention. So one can intend recalcitrant social ends. The conditions against which I argue are known in the literature as the Own Action Condition, the Control Condition, and the Settle Condition. I present cases where, intuitively, agents genuinely intend ends that would be ruled out by these conditions. (shrink)

Rebecca Farinas takes seven major figures from the American philosophical canon and examines their relationship with an artistic or scientific interlocutor. In so doing, she provides a unique insight into the origins of American philosophy and, through case studies such as the friendship between Alain Locke and the biologist E.E. Just and the collaboration between Jane Addams and George Herbert Mead, sheds new light on these thinkers' ideas.

Despite recent research showing that children rapidly interpret human action in terms of intention, a long tradition of empirical research on moral development and recent conceptual analyses of the deontic domain suggest that children do not apply their understanding of intention to the deontic domain. However, two experiments are described showing that children do make that connection. Preschool children heard stories in which a protagonist was obliged to meet a particular condition if an action was to be taken (e.g. obliged (...) to wear a coat if playing outside). When shown four pictures depicting each possible combination of: (1) the protagonist either performing the action or not, and (2) deliberately or accidentally failing to meet the obligation, children appropriately identified the protagonist as naughty when he or she was depicted as deliberately not meeting the obligation while performing the action. The findings proved to be robust across two different cultural settings. Implications for research on children’s developing theory of mind and their understanding of deontic concepts are discussed. (shrink)

Biosemiotics to date has focused on the exchange of signals between organisms, in line with bioacoustics; consideration of the wider acoustic environment as a semiotic medium is under-developed. The nascent discipline of ecoacoustics, that investigates the role of environmental sound in ecological processes and dynamics, fills this gap. In this paper we introduce key ecoacoustic terminology and concepts in order to highlight the value of ecoacoustics as a discipline in which to conceptualise and study intra- and interspecies semiosis. We stress (...) the inherently subjective nature of all sensory scapes and propose that they should always bear an organismic attribution. Key terms to describe the sources and scales of soundscapes are described. We introduce epithets for soundscapes to point to the degree to which the global environment is implicated in semiosis ; terms for describing key ecological structures and processes and examples of ecoacoustic events are described. The acoustic eco-field is recognized as the semiotic model that enables soniferous species to intercept core resources like food, safety and roosting places. We note that whilst ecoacoustics to date has focused on the critical task of the development of metrics for application in conservation and biodiversity assessment, these can be enriched by advancing conceptual and theoretical foundations. Finally, the mutual value of integrating ecoacoustic and biosemiotics perspectives is considered. (shrink)

What is a ‘number,’ as studied within numerical cognition? The term is highly polysemous, and can refer to numerals, numerosity, and a diverse collection of mathematical objects, from natural numbers to infinitesimals. However, numerical cognition has focused primarily on prototypical counting numbers – numbers used regularly to count small collections of objects. Even these simple numbers are far more complex than apparent pre-conditions for numerical abilities like subitizing and approximate discrimination of large numerosity, which we share with other animals. We (...) argue that the leap to number concepts proper relies, in part, on two embodied, domain-general cognitive mechanisms: conceptual metaphor and fictive motion. These mechanisms were first investigated within cognitive linguistics, a subdiscipline of cognitive science, but are now thought to subserve cognition more generally. We review the proposal that these mechanisms structure numerical cognition – including PCNs, but also the positive integers and arithmetic – and survey the supporting empirical evidence. (shrink)

In recent metaethical debate over ways to justify the notion of intrinsic natural value, some neopragmatists have challenged realist conceptions of scientific and moral truth. Holmes Rolston defends a critical-realist epistemology as the basis for a metaphysics of "projective nature" and a cosmological narrative--both of which set up a historical ontology of objective natural value. Pure ecological science informs the wilderness experience of Rolston's ideal epistemic subject, the "sensitive naturalist." The author argues that Rolston's account of the relation between knowing (...) and valuing can be clarified and strengthened by appropriating Bernard Lonergan's transcendental method. Conversely, Lonergan's view of moral self-transcendence can be developed further in light of Rolston's virtue epistemology, which is embodied in the figure of the sensitive naturalist. (shrink)

The fact that boundaries are ontologically dependent entities is agreed by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. This article studies both authors as a single metaphysical account about boundaries. The Brentano-Chisholm theory understands that boundaries and the objects to which they belong hold a mutual relationship of ontological dependence: the existence of a boundary depends upon a continuum of higher spatial dimensionality, but also is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of a continuum. Although the view that ordinary material (...) objects and their boundaries (or surfaces) ontologically depend on each other is correct, it does not grasp their asymmetric relationship: while the existence of a surface rigidly depends upon the existence of the very object it belongs to, the existence of a physical object generically depends upon having some surface. In modal terms, both are two kinds of de re ontological dependence that this article tries to distinguish. (shrink)

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Describing resources and their relationships with organisms seems to be a useful approach to a ‘unified ecology’, contributing to fill the gap between natural and human oriented processes, and opening new perspectives in dealing with biological complexity. This Resource Criterion defines the main properties of resources, describes the mechanisms that link them to individual species, and gives a particular emphasis to the biosemiotic approach that allows resources to be identified inside a heterogeneous ecological medium adopting the eco-field model. In particular, (...) this Criterion allows to couple matter, structured energy and information composing the ecological systems to the biosemiotic and cognitive mechanisms adopted by individual species to track resources, transforming neutral surroundings into meaningful species-specific Umwelten. The expansion of the human semiotic niche that is a relevant evolutionary process of the present time, assigns the role of powerful and efficient agency to the Resources Criterion to evaluate the effect of human intrusion into the natural systems with habits of key stone species, under the challenge of a growing use of alloctonous, immaterial and symbolic resources of the actual globalized societal models. The Resource Criterion interprets the ecological dynamics contributing to complete the epistemology of the ecology, to open a bridge toward economy and other societal sciences, and to contribute to formulate a General Theory of Resources. (shrink)

As we write this research paper, we notice an explosion in popularity of machine learning in numerous fields (ranging from governance, education, and management to criminal justice, fraud detection, and internet of things). In this contribution, rather than focusing on any of those fields, which have been well-reviewed already, we decided to concentrate on a series of more recent applications of deep learning models and technologies that have only recently gained significant track in the relevant literature. These applications are concerned (...) with artistic production (Sect. 2.1), the writing process (Sect. 2.2), music production (Sect. 2.3), text recognition and attribution (Sect. 2.4). After reviewing and analyzing the positive contributions as well as some of the major limitations of these technologies in each of those fields, we critically reflect (Sect. 3) on how their widespread implementation may affect humans and their creativity. In Sect. 4, we notice that deep learning models are here to stay; so, rather than embracing a negative or pessimistic stance with respect to their future applications in creative domains, we suggest a balanced approach for their assessment and beneficial usage. Finally (Sect. 5), we conclude by summarising what we have achieved and by pointing out possible future research directions. (shrink)

Craig Hanks and Aili Bresnahan are contributing editors only -- not main editors.